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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is a major threat facing corporations and countries all around the world. 
Corruption not only destroys lives and communities, but also undermines countries and 
institutions (Transparency International, 2012). Combating corruption requires the efforts and 
collaboration of regulatory authorities, external auditors, investigators, and the governing 
board (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2014). However, this paper is focusing only on the role 
of external auditors and efforts of audit regulators in combating corruption. A thorough 
examination and review of audit standards as well as prior literature revealed that the role of 
external auditors with regards to corporate corruption was neither given enough attention in 
the literature nor clearly defined in the audit standards.  
The objectives of this paper are twofold. Firstly, it aims to clarify the role of external auditors 
with regards to corporate corruption. Secondly, it aims at showing the impact of corruption 
on the financial statements and the audit profession by providing evidence from actual 
corruption cases and prior literature. The current paper also offers recommendations to 
external auditors, audit regulators, and researchers on how to combat corruption.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; Section II discusses the responsibilities of 
external auditors in relation to corporate corruption and identifies gaps in audit standards 
related to this area. This section also examines the impact of corruption on the financial 
statements by providing evidence from prior literature. Section III explains the impact that 
corporate corruption might have on the audit profession by providing evidence from actual 
corruption cases. Section IV critically reviews prior literature into corruption and the role of 
external auditors. It also identifies gaps in prior literature related to this area. Section V 
includes the conclusion as well as recommendations to audit regulators, external auditors, and 
researchers on how to combat corruption. Section VI suggests ideas for future studies that 
might help in combating corporate corruption 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Reviewing prior literature showed a stream of research into the impact of corruption on the 
economy, and the links between corruption and culture. For instance, Lambsforff (2003) 
found that corruption is likely to reduce investment which will also bring about a lower GDP. 
Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui (2006) found that tax compliance internationally is positively 
related to the successful control of corruption. Kimuyu (2007) found that not only does 
corruption undermine firm growth but also reduces the propensity to export. Freckleton et al 
(2011) found that in the cases of the developing economies, lower levels of corruption 
enhance the impact that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has on economic growth. 
Papconstantinou et al. (2013) found that corruption has a negative impact on economic 
growth. Seleim and Bontis (2009) explored the relationship between culture and corruption 
and the findings revealed that individual collective practices encourage corruption, and 
uncertainty avoidance increases levels of corruption. The authors defined uncertainty 
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avoidance as “the extent to which a society relies on norms and procedures to cover events 
and situations in their daily lives” (p.168). Characteristics of a society with high uncertainty 
avoidance include the use of formality in interacting with others, relying on formalised 
policies and procedures, taking moderate and carefully calculated risks, and showing strong 
resistance to change (Grove, 2005).  
Our review has also shown that only a few studies have examined the role of external 
auditors and/or the audit profession in combating corruption. Indeed no study seen by the 
authors has actually examined the responsibilities of the external auditors in relation to 
corruption. For instance, Uecher et al. (1981) investigated whether managers' perceptions of 
external auditor serve as a deterrent to corporate irregularities. However, their results did not 
support this hypothesis. The authors suggested that external auditors are expected to make 
additional efforts to detect irregularities to change management perception. Some of the few 
relevant studies found were Albrecht et al’s (2012) investigation of whether the existence of a 
professional oversight body and specific education regulations were associated with a 
country’s perceived level of corruption. Their findings revealed that countries that have 
established an audit profession oversight body are perceived to be less corrupt. They also 
found that countries requiring practical experience, academic study, and a licensing 
examination in order to practise auditing are perceived to be less corrupt. Kimbro, (2002) 
argued that the probability of detecting corruption could increase by increasing 
accountability, transparency, independent oversight, audits, and information access. Brown et 
al (2013) investigated the relationship between political corruption and firm value. Their 
findings revealed that strong audit monitoring can mitigate the negative firm value effects of 
political corruption within the U.S. Lamoreaux et al (2014) investigated the role of 
accounting and audit quality in the allocation of international development aid loans provided 
by the World Bank. Their findings indicate that the amount of aid lent by the World Bank to 
a country is higher for countries with stronger accounting and audit quality. They also found 
that accounting and audit quality are associated with World Bank lending only in countries 
with relatively high level of corruption.  
Although evidence from prior literature showed that sound external audit could help in 
combating corruption, there is still a huge gap of knowledge in this area especially when it 
comes to the responsibility of external auditors with regards to corporate corruption and how 
external auditors could actually assess and respond to corruption risks.  
 
III. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF EXTERNAL AUDITORS IN RELATION 
TO CORPORATE CORRUPTION 
An examination of the audit standards revealed that although the efforts of audit regulators in 
combating fraud cannot be denied, little attention has been given to external auditors’ 
responsibilities with regards to corporate corruption. For instance, in relation to fraud, the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued the International 
Standard on Auditing (ISA) No.200 Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the 
Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with International Standards on Auditing and ISA No. 
240 the Auditor’s Responsibility Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements. The 
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Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
issued the Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS) No.99 Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit in 2002. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board also 
issued AU Section 316 Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. However 
none of these audit standards made a direct reference to external auditors’ responsibilities 
with regards to corporate corruption which was only implicitly implied and in some instances 
seemingly ignored, assuming that corruption has no impact on the financial statements.  
 For instance, ISA No.200 stated that “external auditors are responsible for detecting material 
misstatements whether due to errors or fraud” (Para.5, p.3). Given that corruption is a type of 
internal fraud (Wells, 2005), external auditors are likely responsible for detecting material 
misstatements arising from it. However this was again ignored by ISA No.240, and SAS 
No.99 that require external auditors to assess and respond to fraud risks arising from only two 
types of internal fraud “asset misappropriation and financial reporting fraud”. ISA.240 
justified this by stating that asset misappropriation and financial reporting fraud are more 
likely to have an impact on the financial statements (ISA 240, para.A1–A6). SAS No.99 did 
not explain its rationale.  
This indicates that both standards assumed that corruption does not have an impact on the 
financial statements although evidence from prior literature seems to show otherwise. For 
instance, Pacini et al. (2002) stated that transparency in financial reporting is impaired by 
bribery activities. Corrupt employees can cause employers to overpay for goods and services 
bought by a company in which the employees have a hidden interest. This form of corruption 
is called “conflict of interest”. These conflicts of interest can also lead to writing off sales 
through the use of discounts or allowances. Inadequate disclosure of conflicts of interest and 
related parties transactions could also have an impact on the financial statements and may 
mislead shareholders. Corrupt payments could be made by normal business checks. 
Disguised payments on the payer’s accounting records might appear as some sort of 
legitimate business expense such as consulting fees. Loans and credit cards expenses could 
also be used as a form of bribe (ACFE, 2012). Corruption could also have an impact on the 
financial statements because the procurement of high-value goods and services. In addition, 
most bribery involves disbursement of cash and the recording of that disbursement in the 
financial records (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2014; Wells, 2011). Other accounts that 
could be affected by corruption include petty cash, gifts, travel and entertainment payments, 
reimbursements, accounts receivable, donations, and sales contracts (Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 2014). Payments of bribes recorded in the accounting records are more likely to be 
in the form of fictitious payables, false purchases, ghost employees, interest-free loans, 
fictitious bids or overbilling (Vona, 2008; Wells, 2011). Cooper and Fargher (2011) 
considered that the concealment of bribes can take place through charging the company for 
services that were not performed or invoice the company at an inflated rate or in the form of 
loans, accounts receivable, or bonus payments to corporate officers. This results in 
misrepresentation of expenses and assets in the financial statements.  
Corruption is also an illegal act that is prohibited by laws and regulations in countries around 
the world. For example, The Bribery Act 2010 was introduced to update and enhance UK 
law. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits U.S. persons and businesses 
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from making payments to foreign government officials or politicians to influence business 
dealings (the Institute of Internal Auditors, 2014). The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has played a vital role through the development and 
adoption of the 1997 convention in addressing global concerns regarding bribery around the 
world (Pacini et al, 2002).  Audit standards also explained the responsibility of external 
auditors with regards to illegal acts. For instance, ISA No.250 Consideration of Laws and 
Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements and SAS No.54 Illegal Acts by Clients 
required external auditors to take into consideration the applicable legal and regulatory 
framework in conducting the audit of financial statements. ISA No. 250 stated that “The 
auditor shall obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding compliance with the 
provisions of those laws and regulations generally recognized to have a direct effect on the 
determination of material amounts and disclosures in the financial statements” (2009, para 
A8). SAS No.54 stated: 
 “The auditor's responsibility to detect and report misstatements resulting from illegal acts having a 
direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts is the same as that for 
misstatements caused by error or fraud. The auditor considers laws and regulations that are generally 
recognized by auditors to have a direct and material effect on the determination of financial 
statement amounts” (1989, AU §317.05) 
However, both standards did not directly refer to corruption or the responsibilities of the 
external auditors with regards to corruption. In addition, SAS No.54 did not mention whether 
corruption risks could have a direct or indirect impact on the financial statements. It was not 
also clear how external auditors could decide on whether an illegal act has a direct or indirect 
impact on the financial statements. ISA No.250 provided some examples of indicators for 
non-compliance with laws and regulations that external auditors need to consider (para. A13) 
that were similar to examples of red flags of bribery cited by Wells (2005) in his book 
Principles of Fraud Examination - such as: “cases when low-bid awards are frequently 
followed by change orders or amendments that significantly increase payments to the 
vendor”, “unusual or unexplained fluctuation in payables, expenses or disbursements”, 
“unusually high price contracts for goods or services purchased by the company”, and 
“improper or unauthorized payment for goods or services”. This indicates that the standard 
implicitly required external auditors to assess and respond to bribery and corruption risks as 
long as it has a material impact on the financial statements however this was not directly 
mentioned in the audit standards.  
This lack of clarity about the responsibilities of external auditors with regards to corporate 
corruption could make external auditors overlook their responsibility for detecting material 
corruption which could have an impact on the financial statements since this was not 
explicitly required by audit standards. This might increase auditors’ liability and litigation 
costs. It might also result in inconsistency in complying with the requirements of the audit 
standards for illegal acts. The consequences of this could be severe not only in terms of 
losing shareholders’ confidence in the audit profession but also the ability of audit firms to 
survive in the market as a result of a damaged reputation. The next section shows the impact 
of corruption on the audit profession by providing evidence from actual corruption cases and 
prior literature.  
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IV. THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON THE AUDIT PROFESSION  
The impact of corruption on reputational risk may be severe even when financial impact is 
minimal (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2014). When corporations suddenly fail or if it is 
revealed that management or key employees are involved in fraudulent activities, the validity 
of the financial statements of these corporations is often called into question. Once financial 
manipulation is revealed, the external auditor also comes under scrutiny (Cooper and Fargher, 
2011). For instance the recent investigations at FIFA have brought corruption and in 
particular bribery into the public spotlight. The FIFA corruption scandal does not only 
involve charges that at least $150 million in corrupt payments were made to FIFA officials, 
but it is centred on a sport that is followed by more than two billion fans around the world. 
Preparation and hosting of FIFA world cup tournaments lead to billions of dollars of 
infrastructure expenditures and can have a dramatic impact on local economies. The FIFA 
scandal does raise a particular issue for auditors. The fact that FIFA’s external auditor KPMG 
issued a clean opinion on the organisation’s financial statements continues to raise questions 
about the value of the audit service (Verver, 2015). Browning (2015) said that: “Despite 
longstanding suspicion of corruption, world soccer’s governing body has received a clean bill 
of financial health for 16 consecutive years from KPMG. It is legitimate to raise questions 
about the effectiveness of the audits, given that the risks were already widely rumoured and 
the auditor issued a clean report all these years”  
In Brazil's Petrobras corruption scandal in 2015, 27 people were charged with corruption and 
money laundering, the company wrote off $2 billion for bribery-related costs. The company’s 
debt rose from $25 billion to $170 billion in 2014. The Petrobras CEO and five senior 
directors resigned after the corruption scandal. Third parties were hired as subcontractors to 
provide services to Petrobras with the cost of the work being inflated to hide the illegal 
payments made. Petrobras also faces a class action lawsuit from shareholders who claim the 
company released false statements and misled investors about its assets. The company had to 
delay the release of audited financial statements because of uncertainty about the amount of 
write-offs for political corruption-related costs. Petrobas auditors, PwC, refused to sign off 
the accounts due to the corruption scandal and the lack of clarity on the accounts (Watts, 
2015). However, PwC was criticised for not examining the procurement processes carefully 
as part of their audit (Smith, 2015).  
In 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Siemens with violations of 
the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA). Siemens has agreed to pay a $450 million criminal fine to the U.S. 
Department of Justice and a fine of €395 million to the Office of the Prosecutor General in 
Munich, Germany. In the fall of 2003, Siemens' external auditor KPMG identified €4.12 
million in cash that was taken to Nigeria by Communications Company (COM) employees 
and flagged the payments for review. However, no actions were taken by either the board of 
directors or the audit committee of Siemens. KPMG have also reported at least 250 
suspicious payments made through Intercom to companies in foreign jurisdictions on behalf 
of COM and Siemens' Italian subsidiary. The audit report was provided to the board of 
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directors of Intercom, as well as to certain members of Siemens’ Corporate Compliance 
Office, however they made no attempt to investigate these facts, nor explore whether they 
were related to other similar instances of wrongdoing (U.S Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Litigation Release No. 20829 / December 15, 2008). However, there was no 
evidence about how KPMG reacted to this which indicates that external auditors still need 
guidance on how to respond to heightened corruption risks especially when corrective actions 
are not taken by top management and auditor’s comments are ignored.  
In the Wal-Mart corruption case, a small shareholder group said the company’s longtime 
auditor, Ernst & Young, knew about possible bribery in Mexico long before the company 
disclosed it to U.S. authorities. CtW Investment Group, which works with union pension 
funds that hold about 0.15% of Wal-Mart Stores Inc. stock also said that Ernst & Young 
should have reported the suspected bribery to the SEC and should be investigated by the 
accounting oversight board, because the acts under investigation and how the investigation 
was handled could have affected the retailer’s financial statements (Nassauer, 2015).  
The public expectations of the external auditors with regards to detecting corruption or at 
least being able to identify corruption risks indicates that external auditors and audit 
regulators should give more attention to corruption. This in turn requires audit regulators to 
clarify the role of external auditors with regards to corporate corruption and provide them 
with guidance on how to assess and respond to corruption risks. Khan (2006, p.4) stated that: 
“the public expectations are that the auditors should play an effective role in reducing, if not 
eliminating, corruption”, and if external auditors cannot play a role in detecting corruption, 
they could at least identify areas where opportunities for corruption exist. Pacini et al (2002) 
argued that auditors must satisfy growing expectations, not only in the more conventional 
areas in financial statements but also in relation to the existence of fraud and compliance with 
legal obligations. Auditors now face increased pressure to plan and perform an audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance that material misstatements arising fraudulent acts such as bribery are 
detected and reported. Modugu et al. (2012) mentioned that if external auditors are not 
competent especially in bringing their skills to bear in a corrupt environment, then the whole 
audit process is of no value. Alabede (2012, p.119) concluded that: “the auditors are still 
holding to the principle, which views audit as watchdog not bloodhounds and not expected to 
detect fraud. Unfortunately, times have changed and public expectation of the role of the 
auditors has equally changed”. Adeyemi and Uadiale (2011) argued that unless auditor’s role 
conforms to public expectation, audit profession might risk social action of enforcement or 
penalty for nonconformity.  
 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This paper aimed to clarify the role of external auditors with regards to corporate corruption, 
showing the impact of corruption on the financial statements and the audit profession, and 
providing recommendations to external auditors, audit regulators, and researchers on how to 
combat corruption.  
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Our findings revealed that external auditors are likely responsible for detecting material 
misstatements arising from corruption that would have a material impact on the financial 
statements. However this was not directly and clearly stated in audit standards but rather 
implied. Audit standards also unjustifiably implied that corruption might not have an impact 
on the financial statements unlike other types of internal fraud such as asset misappropriation 
and financial reporting fraud. However, evidence from prior literature proved otherwise and 
showed how corruption could lead to misrepresentations in the financial statements. The 
findings also revealed that in case of corruption scandals, external auditors are likely to come 
under scrutiny. This was evident in some of the recent corruption scandals when external 
auditors failed to discover corrupt practices by their audited clients throughout the years of 
the audit. The public expects external auditors to at least identify opportunities for corruption 
when they exist. Ignoring corruption will negatively impact the reputation of audit firms and 
will raise concerns about the value of external audit. The reason auditors should be worried 
about corruption is that a misstatement resulting from corruption may be more costly to the 
audit firm and probably the entire profession than a misstatement caused by other factors 
such as in the case of error. The FIFA example speaks to this. Many people questioned the 
value of audits because of the clean opinions that FIFA received each year. Although most of 
the public outrage may result from a misunderstanding of auditor responsibilities and auditing 
standards, that misunderstanding may result in higher settlement costs for audit firms.  
Our findings also revealed a gap in prior literature in the area of corruption, mainly the 
responsibility of external auditors with regards to corporate corruption and how external 
auditors could actually assess and respond to corruption risks.  
Hence, the current paper provides the following recommendations to audit regulators, 
external auditors, and researchers on how to combat corruption: 
 Audit regulators should clarify the role of external auditors with regards to corruption. 
This requires audit standards to clearly state that “external auditors are responsible for 
detecting material misstatements due to corruption and that they are required to assess 
and respond to corruption risks”.  
 Audit standards need to explain that corruption is not only a type of internal fraud that 
could have a material impact on the financial statements but also an illegal act. Audit 
regulators should provide guidance to external auditors on how to assess and respond 
to corruption risk. Examples of misstatements due to corruption and illegal acts that 
could have a material impact on the financial statements should also be provided.  
 External auditors still need guidance on how to react to cases when management or 
those charged with governance repeatedly ignore irregularities or weaknesses in the 
internal control system. Repeated mistakes or no efforts by management to take 
timely corrective actions might not only be an indication of weak monitoring but also 
an intention to commit fraud.  
 External auditors need to understand the nature of corruption, the categories of 
corruption, and how each could be committed. This is more likely to help them 
identify possible opportunities for corruption. They also need to understand the scope 
of their responsibility in relation to corruption and the risk of ignoring it.  
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 External auditors need to be aware of high risk accounts that could indicate a high risk 
of opportunity for corruption such as procurements, loans, petty cash, cost of services, 
accounts receivable, loans, credit cards expenses, and disclosures in the financial 
statements especially those related to related-party transactions.  
 External auditors also need to be aware of weaknesses in internal control that could 
increase the opportunity for corruption. For example, lack of adequate segregation of 
duties especially in areas like procurement or at the board level. A lot of power in the 
hand of one person could increase the risk of that person abusing this power by 
engaging in corrupt practices for his or her own benefit. Also tone at the top could 
have a huge impact on an organization’s culture. If top management made it clear that 
bribery and corruption will not be tolerated, then corruption risk might be reduced. 
Thus a detailed assessment of management’s commitment to integrity and ethical 
values, management’s philosophy and operating style, and board of director’s 
participation in the entity’s activities could help external auditors assess the risk of 
corruption.  
 Reviewing existing laws, regulations, and rules including the bidding process as well 
as interviewing key personnel might help external auditors identify any opportunities 
for corruption.  
Researchers have also an important role to play in combating corruption. They can help 
by conducting research that could help develop appropriate training materials for external 
auditors to help them understand the nature of corruption and how it could be committed 
including money laundering techniques used by corrupt individuals, and how external 
auditors could assess and respond to corruption risks. The next section provides some 
ideas for future research into this area.  
 
VI. FUTURE STUDIES  
Future studies should explore audit techniques that might help external auditors assess and 
respond to corruption risks. One useful area might be the use of red flags in assessing 
opportunities for corruption. Prior literature explored the effectiveness of red flags in 
assessing risks arising from asset misappropriation and financial reporting fraud but no study 
actually examined the effectiveness of red flags in assessing corruption risks. Weaknesses in 
the internal control system could also help external auditors in identifying areas where 
opportunities for corruption exist. Thus future research could look into how COSO internal 
control framework might help external auditors identify opportunities for corruption.  
Future research should also examine public’s expectations of external auditors in relation to 
detecting corruption. Research highlighting the impact of corruption on financial statements 
and its implications for external auditors is also needed. A starting point could be an analysis 
of corruption cases to date to explore the types of corruption committed, how each was 
committed and detected, what was the impact on the financial statements, and what were the 
implications for external auditors and the perpetrators.  
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